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thatGreece adoptedlegislation in 2001whichwas in conflictwithRegulationNo3577/92 and that the
market should have been liberalised on1January 2004.While the Commission objected in 2001, the
matter became pressing with the liberalisation of themarket this year.The Commission objects to a
requirement that all non-Greek crewmembers should hold a certificate proving their knowledge of
the Greek language; such a requirement is unjustified, according to the Commission.
On 3 February 2004, the Commission announced its acceptance of Italy's extension of social security
reductions formaritime cabotage services. Italy had extended its scheme to reduce employers' social
security contributions in themaritime cabotage sector.The scheme had been originally approved by
the Commission in 1999^2001 and was approved again in 2002 and 2003.The Commission believed
that the reductionwas within the Community guidelines on state aid tomaritime transport.
JURISDICTION AND ILLEGAL STRIKE ACTION BY SHIPPING TRADE UNION
Jason Chuah
Danmarks Rederiforening, acting on behalf of DFDS Torline A/S v LO Landsorganisationen i Sverige,
acting on behalf of SEKO SjÎfolk Facket fÎr Service och Kommunikation
Case C-18/02 , ECJ, 5 February 2004
In this case DFDS Torline A/S v SEKOSjÎfolk Facket fÎr Service och Kommunikation the ECJ had occasion
to dealwith the relevance of the flag statewhere the claimant shipowner purports to bring an action
within the scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention.TheTor Caledonia was registered in the
Danish international ship register andwas subject toDanish law. Shewas ownedbyDFDSTorlineA/S
and served the route between GÎteberg (Sweden) and Harwich (United Kingdom). DFDS had
employed a crew of Polish nationality. The crew was employed on the basis of individual contracts,
containing terms consistent with a framework agreement between a number of Danish unions on
the one hand, and three Danish associations of shipping companies on the other. Those contracts
were expressed as being governed by Danish law.
The Polish crew was represented by a Swedish trade union, SjÎfolk Facket fÎr Service och
Kommunikation (SEKO). SEKO made a demand on DFDS for a collective agreement which DFDS
rejected. SEKO then served a notice of industrial action by fax instructing its Swedish members not
to accept employment on theTor Caledonia.The fax also stated that SEKO was calling for sympathy
action. The SvenskaTransportarbetarefÎrbundet (SwedishTransport Workers Union)(STAF) gave
notice, upon receipt of the fax, of sympathy action andmade plain that they would refuse to engage
in any work whatsoever relating to the Tor Caledonia. That meant the ship was very likely to be
prevented frombeing loaded or unloaded in Swedish ports.
DFDS brought an action before the Danish Arbejdsret (Labour Court) for an order that the
industrial action and the sympathy action were unlawful.Very soon after the hearing but before a
decision was made, SEKO and STAF decided to terminate industrial action. However, in the
meantime, DFDS had had to remove theTor Caledonia from serving the Harwich-GÎteberg route
and to use a leased vessel instead. DFDS thus brought action against SEKO before another Danish
court claiming that the defendant was liable in tort for giving notice of unlawful industrial action
and inciting another Swedish union to give notice of sympathy action, which was also unlawful.The
damages sought were for the loss allegedly suffered by DFDS as a result of immobilising the Tor
Caledonia and leasing a replacement ship.
Therewere a number of very significant private international law questions that had to be answered
before that claim could be dealt with.They were so important that representations were made not
only by the parties, but also Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Commission. The
position under Danish law was that the Arbejdsret had no jurisdiction to order compensation.
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SEKO's argument was thus that DFDS could not rely on Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention1 to
bring its claim inDenmark. Article 5(3), itmight be recalled, states that inmatters relating to a tort,
delict or quasi-delict, the defendantmaybe sued in the courts for the placewhere the harmful event
occurred.On the other hand, if Article 5(3) did not apply, DFDSwould be required to sue SEKO in
Sweden, the place where SEKO was domiciled. SEKO's argument was supported by the Swedish
Government, whilst Denmark and the United Kingdom took the opposing view. The Arbejdsret
thus referred thematter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.2
The ECJ held that the fact that Denmark had a systemwhereby a ruling on the legality of industrial
actionmaybemadeby a court not competent to hear claims for consequential damagewas not a bar
to the application of Article 5(3).The ECJ saw the argument by SEKO as onewhich operated against
the principles of sound administration of justice and practicality.3 If SEKO's argumentwas correct, it
wouldmean that if the claimantwished to obtain compensation for damage occurringinDenmark, the
claimant would have had first to sue SEKO in Sweden for a ruling that the actionwas illegal and then
subsequently, bring an action for damages before a Danish court.The court relied on the recent case
of Italian Leather4 in reiterating that the object of the Brussels Convention was not to unify the
procedural rules of the Contracting States, but to determine which court has jurisdiction in
disputes concerning civil and commercial matters in intra-Community relations. It would be quite
contrary to the principle of legal certainty where the plaintiff is inconvenienced by a restrictive
reading of Article 5(3). It should also be noted that the intention in Article 5(3) was clearly to offer
the plaintiff a convenient forum to claim damages at the place where the harm or loss occurred.
Artificially separating the two limbs of the action, the legality and the right to compensation, would
not serve this purpose at all.
In this connection it might also be noted that Article 5(3) has in the past been given an expansive
reading by the ECJ. In Mines de Potasse d'Alsace5 one of the first ECJ decisions on Article 5(3), the
court stated that by its comprehensive form of words, Article 5(3) of the Convention covers a` wide
diversity of kinds of liability'. Similarly in Kalfelis6 the court asserted that the concept of matters
relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict c`overs all actions which seek to establish the liability of a
defendant and which are not related to a contract within the meaning of Article 5(1)'. SEKO,
however, emphasised that the Arbejdsret had no jurisdiction to order compensation for harm done,
whatever the nature of the harm. Although there is some force in that argument, the general tenor
from ECJ case law is that the specificity of competence of the national court in question is not
material when applying the jurisdictional rules of the Convention. Moreover, it has been recently
established that even where no financial compensation is claimed as remedy, Article 5(3) can apply
(Henkel,7 a judgment delivered after the present reference wasmade).There, the court had allowed
the consumer protection organisation seeking an injunction to prevent a trader from using unfair
consumer contract terms to rely on Article 5(3).
SEKO stressed that there was no absurdity in its contention because it was possible that following a
ruling by the Arbejdsret that the industrial action was unlawful, it, SEKO, could withdraw the
unlawful action thereby causing no damage to DFDS.That reasoning was not acceptable. As far as
the ECJ was concerned, i`twas notpossible to accept an interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels
1 The Brussels Convention has now been replaced by Regulation 44/2001with effect from 1March 2002. As the Danish court, the
Arbejdsret, made its application for a preliminary ruling on 29 January 2002, this case pre-dates the new Regulation. That said,
Denmark has exercised an opt-out of the new Regulation and is thus still governed by the Convention.
2 An earlier preliminary issue was whether the Arbejdsret had the competence even to make a reference to the ECJ.That objection
was overruled by the ECJ which stated that although the Arbejdsret was not mentioned in the 1971 Protocol's list of Danish courts
empowered tomake such an application, itwas clear that the Arbejdsret had exclusive jurisdiction over certain disputes in employment
law and as such, was a court of first and last instance.
3 See also Case C-269/95 Benincasa [1997] ECR I-3767, paragraph 26.
4 Case C-80/00 [2002] ECR I-4995.
5 Case 21/76 [1976] ECR1735.
6 Case189/87 [1988] ECR 5565.
7 Case C-167/00 [2002] ECR I-8111.
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Convention according towhich application of thatprovision is conditional on the actual occurrence of
damage'.8 Furthermore, the ECJ has also held that the finding that the courts for theplacewhere the
harmful event occurred are usually the most appropriate for deciding the case, in particular on the
grounds of proximity and ease of taking evidence, is equally relevant whether the dispute concerns
compensation for damage which has already occurred or relates to an action seeking to prevent the
occurrence of damage.9
A second question of some interest was that of causation.The Arbejdsret sought clarification as to
whether if it was necessary for the application of Article 5(3) in the present context that t`he harm
caused must be a certain or probable consequence of the industrial action itself or whether it was
sufficient that that industrial actionwas a necessary condition of sympathy actionwhichmayresult in
harm'.10 The questionwas important as it was established inMines de Potasse d'Alsace that liability in
tort, delict or quasi-delict can only arisewhen there is a causal connection between the damage and
the event fromwhich the damage originates. It is clear from the facts that asDFDShadonlyemployed
Polish sailors on the ship in question, the SEKO industrial action in calling its Swedishmembers not to
accept jobs on the ship in question, on its own, would not have caused harm to DFDS. Be that as it
may, without that industrial action therewould not have been any sympathy action by dock andport
workers which in turn led to the cancellation of that route and the leasing of a substitute vessel.The
chain of causation had thus not been broken.
The final question for the ECJ is one of particular interest to maritime lawyers. It was whether
Article 5(3) must be interpreted as meaning that the damage resulting from industrial action taken
by a tradeunion in a Contracting State towhich a vessel registered in another Contracting State sails
can be regarded as having occurred in the flag state, the result being that the shipowner canbring an
action for damages against that tradeunion in the flag state. In short, theArbejdsretwanted to know
from the ECJ whether the damage could be regarded as having occurred in Denmark so that
proceedings might be brought there when it was clear that the notification of industrial action
emanated in Sweden, not Denmark.
There are three possible solutions: DFDS and the Danish Government submitted that the question
shouldbe answered in the affirmative; SEKOand theCommission took the contrary view.TheUnited
Kingdom considered that the question must be answered on the basis of the applicable national law
determined in accordance with Danish rules of private international law. DFDS in part based its
conclusion that the place where the damage occurred was Denmark on the ground that the object
of the proposed industrial action was to change the conditions of employment on board theTor
Caledonia, which was registered in Denmark and was hence to be regarded as Danish territory.The
DanishGovernment also considered itrelevant that the eventgivingrise to the damagewas intended
to produce its effects and influence the other party's conductwhere the ship affectedby the action is
registered andwhere the important decisions concerning the conditions of employmentwere taken,
namely on board the ship.The United Kingdom and the Commission, in contrast, did not regard the
nationality of the ship as relevant to determining the place where the damage occurred within the
meaning of Article 5(3) of the Convention. SEKO and the Commission argued, however, on the basis
of Marinari,11 that the phrase p`lace where the harmful event occurred' should not include the place
where the victim claimed to have suffered financial damage following initial damage arising and
suffered by him in another state. Those parties conclude that in the circumstances of the present
8 Paragraphs 46, 48 ofHenkel (ibid.).
9 Ibid.
10 See paragraph 29 of the Judgment.
11 InCaseC-364/93Marinari [1995] ECR I-2719, the claimant claimeddamages against the defendantbank alleging that thenegligence of
the bank's employees in one country had resulted in his imprisonment in that country and also financial loss in another.The court ruled
that the term p`lace where the harmful event occurred' could not be construed so extensively as to encompass any place where the
adverse consequences can be felt of an eventwhich has already caused damage actually arising elsewhere; consequently, the term could
not include the place where the victim claimed to have suffered financial damage following upon initial damage arising and suffered by
him in another Contracting State.
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case the placewhere the harmful event occurred could not therefore be Denmark but Sweden.
In dealing with the somewhat complicated issue, the ECJ first reiterated the time-honouredrule that
theplacewhere the harmful eventoccurred in Article 5(3) includesboth theplacewhere the damage
occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it.The claimant thus has a choice as to where the
defendant should be suedwhere these two places are different (Shevill and others12). It then went on
to find that thenatural forumwas Swedenwhere the industrial action noticewas given andpublicised
andwhere SEKOhad its head office.However, it did not rule out the possibility that harm could have
been sustained in Denmark. It held that the damagewas financial loss arising from thewithdrawal of
theTorCaledonia fromits normal route and thehire of another ship to serve the sameroute. As far as
the courtwas concerned, itwas for the national court to inquirewhether such financial loss couldbe
regarded ashaving arisen at theplacewhereDFDSwas established.The issue of the flag statewas less
relevant. However, unlike the somewhat entrenched view taken by the United Kingdom and the
Commission, the ECJ considered that in the course of that assessment, it was permissible and
indeed, appropriate, for the national court to take the flag state (or nationality of the vessel) into
account.That factor however is only one of many factors the national court should accommodate in
ascertaining the placewhere the harmful event took place. It should of course be noted that the ECJ
does notmake findings of factwhen giving a preliminaryruling; itwill be for theArbejdsret to decide
whether the harmwas suffered in Denmark where DFDS has its registered office.
It shouldhowever be observed that the nationality of the ship is highly relevantwhere the damage or
harm suffered is alleged to have been sustained on board. In the present case, it would follow that if
the union had been able to mobilise the Polish crew into taking industrial action on board theTor
Caledonia, the flag state should be able to assume civil and commercial jurisdiction. Although the
court was careful not to make too much of the relevance of the ship's nationality, this is an
interesting development in that nationality is generally irrelevant in the application of the
jurisdictional rules of the Brussels regime, but here the court has ruled that, in the case of ships,
nationality may be taken into account when determining where the harm was sustained for the
purposes of civil action.
12 Case C-68/93 [1995] ECR I-415; in that case the court held that the victim of a defamatory statementoriginating in one country but
circulated in another can choose to sue the defendant publisher in either of those countries.
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